

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: <i>Bill</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: <i>pls file in Aebalzy</i>		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ GPO : 1957 - O - 439445

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: MIKE <i>H</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: JOHN F. FYI TWO PAPERS ON THE 1962 AEBALCONY PROGRAM		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

GPO : 1957 - O - 439445

(47)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

Latvian ~~Domestic~~ REDSKIN Program - 1962

The ^{LATVIAN} ~~domestic~~ REDSKIN program for 1962 emerges ^{in a} somewhat unclear form ~~XXXX~~ which might be characterized by the expression "where do we go from here." Certain premises are seemingly in order ^{before} ~~to~~ ^{ing} envision any program. From the gist of official dispatches and "think pieces" by members of SR components it is concluded that the trend is toward ^{more} sophisticated, long term and highly selective type of ^{REDSKIN} operations. With the continuing ^{SR} objective of eventual recruitment of internal assets and the selectivity envisioned it ~~seems other than~~ follows that the REDSKIN effort must be directed towards quality rather than quantity in uncovering ^{AMONG THE LATV EMIGRATION IN THE WEST} would-be travelers. For example, the continuing priorities of Atomic Energy and Guided Missile information, not to be confused with ~~more~~ physical locations/of installations, require a high professional caliber of REDSKINNERS who through careful supervision might be able to establish rapport or access to Soviet ^{LATVIAN} men of science and technology working in these fields. Instead of firing canister at the target and achieving a splattering effect we must now use ordnance whose built-in ballistic properties insure accurate delivery and a reasonably high assurance of effective results. However, to insure meaningful results first of all ~~be~~ there must ~~be~~ a good system of target acquisition. Herein lies the crux of the REDSKIN endeavor for the future.

As an initial step the Latvian desk will endeavor to pinpoint ~~in the Soviet~~ ^{Soviet} the ^{LATVIAN} men of science and other professional backgrounds ~~who might~~ in any way have some reaction ~~to~~ our priority requirements not excluding Soviet ^{LATVIAN} of course individuals who might possess knowledge required in other lesser priority fields. (One might ask ^{properly} what are the Baltic requirements?)

reminis

parameters Sov Latvian
Having outlined the ~~XXXXXXXX~~ of the [^]target area i. e. the names, positions, locations and possible avenues of access, the Latvian desk will ^{direct its efforts} ~~not seek~~ to line up similarly trained professional persons among the Latvian community in the ^{West} ~~States~~ to see what, if any, feasible correspondence, friendships or family ^{ties} ~~relationships~~ might attach to the Soviets ^{Latvians} inside. Once any feasible contact link has been uncovered, assuming that the ^{Latvian} ~~domestic~~ candidate ^{in the West} is willing to exploit it, the desk will then ^{try to nurture} ~~encourage the development~~ the contact on a long range basis through letters, books, ^{personal} ~~contacts~~ under suitable pretexts at conferences in the free world or inside the USSR. Following the experience ~~being~~ gained through the AEFLAG/6-AEALTAR/1 operation a long term file will be compiled to serve as the basis for ^{a possible} ~~the~~ eventual recruitment, ~~which~~. Concurrent with the build-up looking forward to the ultimate objective of internal recruitment CA play from practically the inception of any contact with ^{the Soviet Latv} ~~the target~~ target will be undertaken ^{with whatever} ~~and its~~ ancillary effects ^{that can be} ~~to be determined~~. ACHIEVED.

How/ to proceed in this undertaking is not entirely clear at this time. At the outset we are ^{cancelling POAs and} ~~retiring~~ all files of potential REDSKINNERS who do not meet the ^{new} ~~criteria~~ of the professional caliber we envision. Admittedly some of the retired persons might be suitable for dead drop/ activity ~~by~~ but in the absence of any present need for same the matter is academic at this point. From a review of our remaining POAs we have culled out the few ^{qualified professional persons} ~~individuals~~ who might be able to exploit contacts with some of their opposite numbers inside Latvia and the USSR. ^{to Soviet Latvians}
A review of professional leads [^]received from a variety of sources: contact reports, agent assets, biographic registry/ and compendiums on Soviet men of science, will be carried out. Concurrent with this related

activity ^a similar review will be made of the Latvian professional community in the West. Leads will be gathered and utilized ^{domestically} ~~locally~~ or sent to the responsible field stations as the situation ~~and~~ dictates.

For the foreseeable future there will be a paucity of actual REDSKIN activity ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ and possibly a growing impatience ^{at} ~~some echelons~~ with the absence of glowing reports and sizeable statistics. Allaying ^{the} ~~the~~ endemic American trait of ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ wanting results now, it is ^{hopefully shared by} the considered opinion of the desk case officers and ^{their colleagues} in the field that a refined, long haul approach directed towards the Soviet Latvian target will pay dividends.

No prediction can be made at this time as to when the first REDSKIN mission can be mounted against a Soviet Latvian target on the inside. We do know that closer cooperation between KUBARK divisions is necessary if our goal is to be achieved. Information on the arrival of Soviet Latvian visitors and/or students ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ the USA must be fed to the desk to insure lead time to exploit possible contact, if any, with ^{selected} ~~selected~~ visitors. Moreover, the possibility of grafting assets onto cultural exchange groups going to the Soviet Union must be exercised to the fullest. The Pollyanna attitude of State versus the cynicism of the Soviets in ^{negotiating} ~~seeking~~ cultural exchanges must be resisted lest a very valuable entree to the USSR ^{is} ~~lost~~ entirely. The current "Einbahnstrasse" of the current agreements ~~leaves~~ nullifies a valuable channel to acquire our targets. Quality and selectivity are the essence of the "new look" as seen by the desk case officers.

[/]

Lithuanian Redskin Plans for the Summer of 1962

1. It will be extremely difficult for the Lithuanian desk to meet the standards outlined by SP/3, and EE/G dispatches concerning future mounted Redskin activity.

Briefly, the aforementioned dispatches stated the following points:

- a. There will be no more massive clandestine tourist-type observation missions.
- b. ~~Proximin~~ Operations will be conducted to determine the ~~intent~~ Soviet intentions concerning the West, and particularly the United States, and the Soviet Union's state of readiness to ~~start~~ initiate ^{a war}. These can be determined by running operations to:
 - i. recruit penetration agents, ^{within the overall system} ~~the~~ ~~which manages and directs~~ the which manages and directs Soviet guided missile program.
 - ii. recruit resident agents in those areas immediately adjacent to missile sites and units.
 - iii. obtain information on technical characteristics, production figures, numbers of missiles available, and the state of research and development of Soviet missiles ^{the} ~~program~~.
 - iv. further elicitation type activities against those ^{persons} who have access to intentions and state of readiness information.

2. The Lithuanian desk has as yet not identified any ^{Lith} ~~person~~ who is associated with the overall system which manages and directs the Soviet guided missile program. Available information states that the managerial system is located in the RFSSR and that the system mostly employs Russian born scientists, rather than scientists of Baltic ethnic background. Also, the research and development program pertaining to the Soviet guided missile program is conducted within closely guarded areas which are within the RFSSR. The aforementioned is not stated as an apology for the lack of success in identifying persons associated with the Soviet missile program, but rather to underscore the immensity of the problem, particularly as it concerns the Lithuanian SSR.

*missile # 123
which is in*

3. A review of the members of the Academy of Sciences of the Lithuanian SSR, and of their interests, reflects that none of them are or have been engaged in Soviet guided missile activity. However, the Lithuanian desk will continue to study the backgrounds of these scientists in the event that should a Lithuanian scientist have access to the desired information, then an attempt will be made to locate and recruit a Western scientist who could have a logical reason for wanting to meet the particular scientist. The obvious purpose of this contact would be to assess the Lithuanian scientist and to attempt to elicit the desired information. However, in all fairness, it must be pointed up that the bulk of the Soviet scientists who attend international scientific conferences, whether the conferences are in the USSR or if they are in the West, are of Russian ethnic background. Also, the Lithuanian desk will continue to monitor the movements of the Soviet Lithuanian

??

*missile # 123
which is in*

asked?
if - what not Redkin

all these
info's have
been
info?
check?

20" was
at the time

asked
seen?

a logical reason to meet with the Soviet Lithuanians.

4. There exist several possibilities of obtaining some of the desired information through elicitation. One method is to dispatch selected American Lithuanians ~~that~~ have relatives who live in restricted areas and who may have access to some of the personnel in the missile units. Furthermore, it may be possible, depending upon the relationship between the American Lithuanian and his Lithuanian relative, to establish a more meaningful correspondence to point up Soviet missile activity in Soviet occupied Lithuania. Admittedly, this method is a stab in the dark, but one which must nonetheless be taken. A second elicitation method is to debrief repatriates who have come from restricted areas. Headquarters should encourage FOB to continue to debrief the many returnees from Lithuania, ~~including~~ the returnees from the ~~Klaipeda~~ Kaliningrad area. Headquarters could generate FOB's interest in the aforementioned debriefings by forwarding specific requests to debrief a particular person who has come from a sensitive area. ~~Nothing is to be done~~

5. ~~Exception is taken to the statement that~~

5. The Lithuanian desk should plan to ~~send~~ dispatch at least one REDSKIN agent ^{in 1962} on an observation and relative-contact mission ~~XXXXXXXX~~ to counter some of the publicity given to Communist ~~type~~ tourists from the United States, to take a sampling of the opinions of the people, to observe the economic, ~~condition~~ political, and religious conditions in Soviet occupied Lithuania, ~~to attempt to determine the~~ ~~the~~ and for CA purposes.

TV
who
who

...ing sample 1/02. However, attempts should be made now to

develop sources which will be productive ~~three~~, ~~or~~ four or more years hence.

H. J. A.